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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD IGNORES EVIDENCE WHICH WAS
PRESENTED REGARDING THE PARTIES' MARITAL LIFESTYLE AND
MS. PENROSE'S NEED
In making its woefully insufficient alimony award, the trial
court obviously failed to consider Mr. Penrose's own testimony
regarding

the

parties'

marital

standard

Penrose's established financial needs.

of

living,

and Ms.

In his brief, Mr. Penrose

attempts to support the trial court's award by arguing that Ms.
Penrose's

father

provided

extensive

financial

support

to the

couple, and that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive."
Mr. Penrose not only ignores evidence which was presented regarding
the

parties'

marital

standard

of

living

and

Ms.

Penrose's

reasonable monthly needs, but he also completely disregards the
trial court's express finding regarding his own monthly income.
Mr. Penrose claims that the alimony awarded by the trial court
is appropriate because the parties' admittedly

lavish marital

lifestyle was financed largely by Ms. Penrose's parents.

This

assertion mischaracterizes the evidence which was presented at
trial.

The trial court did

find that Ms. Penrose's parents

assisted the parties financially.

This finding was apparently

based on Mr. Penrose's testimony that Ms. Penrose's father, Lloyd
Hansen, financed trips for the parties during their marriage, and
provided the use of his condominium in Hawaii during the early

1

years of the parties' marriage, which allowed them to concentrate
the development of their business.
However,

the

trial

court

(Tr.Vol. II, p. 295-297)•

also

found

that

the

parties'

lifestyle was based, at least in part, on "the parties' own income
from their businesses11 and "savings accrued from their Hawaiian
business."

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 9 ) .

Furthermore, Mr. Penrose admitted that much of the parties'
lifestyle, particularly after they returned to Utah, was financed
not by Ms. Penrose's father, but by his own income and resources.
Specifically, it was the parties themselves, not Ms. Penrose's
father, who purchased the parties' vehicles (including a Porsche
and a $56,000.00 Mercedes), their $500,000.00 home in Holladay,
their business, Designers Carpet Showroom, their interest in Utah
Water

Sports, and expensive gifts and jewelry, such as Rolex

watches.

(Tr.Vol. II, p. 384-387).

The parties, through their

marital income and assets, also were able to finance nannies and
household help to assist in the care of their son.

(Tr.Vol. II, p.

379-380; Tr.Vol. I, p. 46).
In light of Mr. Penrose's own testimony, this Court should
disregard his argument that the parties' marital lifestyle was
financed primarily

by Ms. Penrose's parents.

Rather, it was

largely Mr. Penrose's own income from the parties' business, along
with their savings from the business which they operated in Hawaii,
that allowed the parties a somewhat lavish marital lifestyle.

2

Mr. Penrose also argues that Ms. Penrose's claimed monthly
expenses were inflated.

The trial court found that Ms. Penrose's

average monthly expenses were approximately $3,800.00, despite the
fact that the evidence established that her monthly expenses, based
upon her marital
$5,974.04.

standard

of

living, totalled

not

less than

In support of its finding, the trial court stated only

that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive."
Fact and Conclusions of Law, fl 9) .

(Findings of

Mr. Penrose claims that "the

trial court had ample justification for finding that these expenses
were inflated."

See Brief, at p. 14.

However, not only did the

trial court fail to offer support for its Finding, it also failed
to address the fact that Ms. Penrose's uncontroverted1 testimony
established expenses of $5,974.04.
In his brief, Mr. Penrose attempted to support the trial
court's alimony award by stating that, based upon testimony by his
accountant, Bret Wynn, his average monthly net income is only
$5,833.00.

See Brief, at p. 14.

This assertion is directly

contrary to the trial court's express finding that Mr. Penrose's
income for purposes of determining awards of child support and
alimony was $8,932.00 per month.
of Law, f 5) .

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

Mr. Penrose's claimed monthly income cannot be

unsupported by the evidence.
1

Although Mr. Penrose stated that he thought some of Ms.
Penrose's claimed expenses were "high," he offered no support for
this conclusion, and had not seen any of her bills. (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 244-246.
3

Based upon the trial court's finding regarding Mr. Penrose's
established monthly income in the amount of $8,932.00, and Mr.
Penrose's own testimony regarding the parties' marital lifestyle,
this Court should overturn the trial court's award of alimony and
direct that an award more commensurate with Mr. Penrose's income,
Ms.

Penrose's

established

expenses, and

the

parties' marital

standard of living be entered.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION AND DIVISION OF MARITAL DEBTS AND
PROPERTY IS PATENTLY INEQUITABLE
In his Brief, Mr. Penrose also attempts to justify the trial
court's

improper

valuation

and

inequitable

distribution

of

property. The trial court awarded the parties' business, Designers
Carpet Showroom, to Mr. Penrose, and valued the business at $0 for
purposes

of property

earnings potential2.

division, despite

its proven growth and

The trial court also awarded Mr. Penrose a

cash asset to repay family debt, without doing the same for Ms.
Penrose. Given the trial court's property and debt allocation, Ms.
Penrose will be left with virtually no property after payment of
debt she was ordered to assume.
The trial

court valued

the parties' business

at

$0 for

purposes of property division, due to a contingent sales tax

2

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial
court specifically stated that Designers Carpet Showroom has
"significant value as evidenced by historical and present
earnings." (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 13(a)) .
4

liability, the amount, if any, of which has yet to be determined.
However,

Mr.

Penrose

stipulated

to

Mr.

Stephen

Nicolatus's

valuation of the business at $194,000.00 without consideration of
the contingent tax liability, which is a far cry from the $0 figure
assigned by the trial court.

As Bret Wynn, a certified public

accountant called to testify by Mr. Penrose stated,

fl

a portion of

the sales tax, one of the components of the sales tax is in
question

or,

rather,

is

in

negotiation

and

we

feel

fairly

comfortable that the amount will be reduced, or a reduction of the
existing liability."

(Tr.Vol. II, p. 343). Additionally, exhibits

"D" and "E" to Mr. Penrose's Brief state that the tax liability is
only an "estimate."
Furthermore, the trial court itself found that the business
has significant value and earning potential.
Conclusions of Law, f 13(a)).

(Findings of Fact and

Consequently, although testimony

regarding the contingent sales tax liability may support the trial
court's finding, the trial court utterly failed to consider the
stipulated present fair market value of the business and its own
statement regarding the business's future earnings potential, as
well as the contingent nature of the tax liability, in valuing the
business for property distribution purposes.
Nor is there any evidence in favor of the trial court's
valuation of the Key Bank certificate of deposit at $29,000.00 for
property

division purposes when

$69,000.00

as

established

by

it, in fact, has a value of
the

5

uncontroverted

evidence.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5 13(c)).

The trial

court offered no rationale for valuing the asset at less than one
half its value for property division purposes, other than the fact
that Mr. Penrose owed $4 0,000.00 to his grandmother3.
The

trial

distribution
substantial

and

court's

failure

valuation

disadvantage.

of

to

render

a

more

equitable

assets place Ms. Penrose

at a

Mr. Penrose argues that the trial

court's award effected an equal distribution of assets between the
parties.

What this argument fails to recognize is the fact that

Ms. Penrose's debts amount to $107,981.314.

Her property award

consists of $109,000.00 from the parties' escrow account, her
leased vehicle, and furniture.

After payment of debts, then, Ms.

Penrose will have little more than $1,000.00 in liquid assets.

3

Furthermore, the only evidence that was presented in
support of Mr. Penrose's claim that he had in fact borrowed
$40,000.00 from his grandmother was Mr. Penrose's own testimony,
and the copy of a check from his grandmother's account. (Tr. Vol.
II, p. 309-310). Mr. Penrose admitted that there is no written
documentation evidencing the loan.
Nor is there a written
repayment agreement. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 381).
4

Mr. Penrose argues that Ms. Penrose's debt to her father
should not be considered because it was incurred mainly after the
parties' separation. See Brief of Appellee, p. 17. However, this
argument ignores the fact that the date for determining valuation
of assets is ordinarily the date of divorce, not separation, unless
the court provides otherwise in the Findings of Fact or Decree of
Divorce. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P. 2d 260 (Utah Ct.App. 1993)
(valuation of asset at date of separation, rather than divorce,
improper) . Here, the court made no such finding. In fact, the
court made absolutely no finding as to whether Ms. Penrose's debt
constituted marital or separate debt.
The absence of such a
finding constitutes reversible error.
6

Mr.

Penrose, on the

other

hand, will have

an asset of

significant earning potential valued at $0, plus an asset to pay
his debt, a certificate of deposit valued at $29,000.00 with an
actual

value

evidence,

of

$69,000.00

$69,000.00

as

established

by

from the parties' escrow

uncontroverted
account, and a

Bronco, snowmobiles and a trailer, none of which are leased, as is
Ms.

Penrose's

vehicle.

The

court's

patently

inequitable

distribution of property and debt results in significant prejudice
to Ms. Penrose; she is left with virtually no liquid assets, while
Mr. Penrose, even after payment of debts, is left with assets in
excess of $100,000.00.

Such an inequitable division requires

reversal on this ground alone.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD DOES NOT INCLUDE
CONSIDERATION OF FACTORS REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW AND
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
Despite the fact that the parties' combined monthly income
exceeds the highest guideline amount, and testimony which was
presented regarding the benefits and opportunities enjoyed by the
parties' minor

child

during

the marriage, the court made no

findings regarding the financial needs of the parties' child. Mr.
Penrose's argument fails to address these factors.
The trial court merely calculated the amount of the parties'
combined monthly income, and set a base child support award based
upon the guidelines.

Clearly, the court was required to make

specific findings as to the financial needs of Miles Penrose,
7

because extensive evidence was presented at trial regarding the
parties'

marital

lifestyle,

which

included

extensive

travel,

recreational opportunities, and private education for their son.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, 29, 188, 189).

The court utterly failed to

address the issue of whether Miles may continue such a lifestyle on
a child

support

award

of

$669.00 per month, even though Mr.

Penrose's income allows a higher amount.
Mr. Penrose argues, based on Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006
(Utah

Ct.App.

necessary.

1996),

that

such

specific

findings

were

However, the Ball court merely held that

not

"linear

extrapolation" from the guidelines is not appropriate where income
exceeds the highest guideline amount.

Id. at 1014. Ms. Penrose is

not requesting such linear extrapolation; rather, she merely asks
that

the

court

"consider

and

make

specific

findings

on

all

"appropriate and just" factors," as required by the Ball court.
Id. at 1014.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES DOES NOT
PROPERLY CONSIDER MS. PENROSE'S NEED
The trial court ordered the parties to bear their own attorney
fees and costs.

Such an order given the facts of this case does

not conform to the requirements of Utah law, which requires the
trial court to consider of the parties' need and ability to pay in
determining whether to award attorney fees.

8

The Findings of Fact state conclusorily, and erroneously, that
Ms. Penrose has sufficient monetary assets, based upon the property
division, to pay her own attorney fees.
Conclusions

of

Law,

f

15) .

The

(Findings of Fact and

trial

court's

decision

is

apparently based on the property award, which granted Ms. Penrose
$109,000.00 from the parties' escrowed funds. This is essentially
the only asset awarded Ms. Penrose, other than her leased vehicle.
However, the trial court's decision ignores the fact that Ms.
Penrose

is

$100,000.00
constitute

ordered

to

out

her

of

repay

approximately

a

debt

property
one-third

to

of

over

legal

fees

of the total amount.

Ms.

award,

her
of

father

which

Penrose's father, Mr. Hansen, paid approximately $32,000.00 of her
attorney fees.

However, Ms. Penrose's claimed attorney fees total

$89,239.02. Mr. Penrose's accusation of "double-dipping" simply is
not supported by the facts.
The trial court also failed to consider the fact that Ms.
Penrose's imputed monthly income is much lower than Mr. Penrose's
actual monthly

income, a fact which

is relevant both to Ms.

Penrose's need and Mr. Penrose's ability to pay, two of the factors
required to be considered by Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489 (Utah
Ct.App. 1991), which were ignored by the trial court.
Furthermore,

Mr.

Penrose's

argument

regarding

reasonableness of the requested fees is inapposite.

the

Here, the

trial court made absolutely no finding regarding the reasonableness
of the requested fees.

In determining reasonableness of requested
9

fees, a trial court may consider "the difficulty of the litigation,
the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the number
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the
locality, the amount involved in the case and the result attained,
and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved." Bell,
at 493-94.
Here, Mr. Penrose's attempt to compare Ms. Penrose's claimed
attorney fees with his own fails to recognize the fact that Ms.
Penrose

presented

extensive

testimony

regarding

her

unique

circumstances; specifically, that she was forced to retain new
counsel at a late date in the proceedings due to the untimely death
of her prior counsel5.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's award of alimony fails to allow Ms. Penrose
to maintain the same standard of living she enjoyed during her
marriage, which was sustained largely by the parties' own income
and savings. Furthermore, the trial court presented no support for
its finding that Ms. Penrose's claimed expenses were "excessive,"
nor has Mr. Penrose advanced such support.
The trial court's division of debts and property leaves Ms.
Penrose with essentially no property, other than a leased vehicle,
after payment of her debt.

Mr. Penrose, on the other hand, was

5

Furthermore, although Mr. Penrose was allowed to present a
proffer of his own attorney fees, no documentation regarding such
fees was offered or received into evidence. (Tr.Vol. II, p. 409410) .
10

given a significant asset with which to pay his debt, as well as a
business of proven economic value, both valued at $0 for purposes
of property division.
In setting the child support award, the court failed to
consider

the

specific

omission which

needs

of the parties' minor

is objectionable

child, an

because the parties' combined

monthly income exceeds the statutory guidelines.
Finally, the court erred in requiring the parties to bear
their own attorney fees without considering Ms. Penrose's need;
specifically,

the

fact

that

Mr.

Penrose's

monthly

income

is

significantly higher than Ms. Penrose's, and Ms. Penrose will be
left with virtually no assets from the property division after
payment of debt.
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*

i
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